MCP tools are implicated in several new attack techniques. Here's a look at how they can be manipulated for good, such as logging tool usage and filtering unauthorized commands.
Over the last few months, there has been a lot of activity in the Model Context Protocol (MCP) space, both in terms of adoption as well as security. Developed by Anthropic, MCP has been rapidly gaining traction across the AI ecosystem. MCP allows Large Language Models (LLMs) to interface with tools and for those interfaces to be rapidly created. MCP tools allow for the rapid development of “agentic” systems, or AI systems that autonomously perform tasks.
Beyond adoption, new attack techniques have been shown to allow prompt injection via MCP tool descriptions and responses, MCP tool poisoning, rug pulls and more.
Prompt Injection is a weakness in LLMs that can be used to elicit unintended behavior, circumvent safeguards and produce potentially malicious responses. Prompt injection occurs when an attacker instructs the LLM to disregard other rules and do the attacker’s bidding. In this blog, I show how to use techniques similar to prompt injection to change the LLM’s interaction with MCP tools. Anyone conducting MCP research may find these techniques useful.
On April 26, an unauthorized user exploited a vulnerability with a GitHub workflow to gain unauthorized access to tokens, all of which have now been invalidated. At this time, our investigation has found no evidence of code modifications, unauthorized access to production systems, exposure of customer data, or access to personal information.
ASUS recently disclosed a critical security vulnerability affecting routers that have AiCloud enabled, potentially allowing remote attackers to perform unauthorized execution functions on vulnerable devices.
The vulnerability is being tracked as CVE-2025-2492 and was given a CVSS score of 9.2 on a 10.0 scale, making it classified as critical.
According to ASUS researchers, the "improper authentication control vulnerability," which only exists in certain ASUS router firmware series, can be triggered by a "crafted request" on behalf of the attackers.
A critical resource that cybersecurity professionals worldwide rely on to identify, mitigate and fix security vulnerabilities in software and hardware is in danger of breaking down. The federally funded, non-profit research and development organization MITRE warned today that its contract…
A vulnerability impacting multiple ESET products has been exploited by an APT group to load malicious DLL libraries and silently deploy malware, Kaspersky reports.
The issue, tracked as CVE-2024-11859, is described as a DLL search order hijacking flaw that could be exploited by attackers with administrative privileges for arbitrary code execution.
Enterprise file transfer solutions are critical infrastructure for many organizations, facilitating secure data exchange between systems and users. CrushFTP, a widely used multi-protocol file transfer server, offers an extensive feature set including Amazon S3-compatible API access. However, a critical vulnerability (CVE-2025-2825) was discovered in versions 10.0.0 through 10.8.3 and 11.0.0 through 11.3.0 that allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass authentication and gain unauthorized access
For the third time in as many months, Apple has released an emergency patch to fix an already exploited zero-day vulnerability impacting a wide range of its products.
The new vulnerability, identified as CVE-2025-24201, exists in Apple's WebKit open source browser engine for rendering Web pages in Safari and other apps across macOS, iOS, and iPadOS. WebKit is a frequent target for attackers because of how deeply integrated it is with Apple's ecosystem.
In September of 2024 while on a customer assigment I encountered the “Network Configuration Operators” group, a so called builtin group of Active Directory (default). As I had never heard of or encountered this group membership before, it sprung to eye immediately. Initially I tried to look up if it had any security implications, like its more known colleagues DNS Admins and Backup Operators, but to no avail. Surpisingly little came up about the group but I couldn’t help myself from probing further. This led me down the rabbithole of Registry Database access control lists and possibilities of weaponization, culminating with the discovery of CVE-2025-21293. Before we move along to the body of work, I have to give out a special thanks to Clément Labro, who initially did the heavy lifting of finding a way to weaponize performancecounters. (This will hopefully make more sense by the end of the article) and my colleagues at ReTest Security ApS, who have provided me with knowledge in the field and the oppertunity to put it to use.
On November 25, 2024, a third party, from SECURE NETWORK BVTECH, reported the D-Link DSL-3788 hardware revision B2 with firmware version vDSL-3788_fw_revA1_1.01R1B036_EU_EN or below, of a Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability.
When D-Link became aware of the reported security issues, we promptly started investigating and developing security patches. Patches were release within the 90-day of the report of the vulnerabilities.
On January 14, Nick Tait announced the discovery of six vulnerabilities in rsync, the popular file-synchronization tool. While software vulnerabilities are not uncommon, the most serious one he announced allows for remote code execution on servers that run rsyncd — and possibly other configurations. The bug itself is fairly simple, but this event provides a nice opportunity to dig into it, show why it is so serious, and consider ways the open-source community can prevent such mistakes in the future.
The vulnerabilities were found by two groups of researchers: Simon Scannell, Pedro Gallegos, and Jasiel Spelman from Google's Cloud Vulnerability Research identified five of them, including the most serious one. Aleksei Gorban, a security researcher at TikTok, discovered the sixth — a race condition in how rsync handles symbolic links.
ESET researchers have discovered a vulnerability that allows bypassing UEFI Secure Boot, affecting the majority of UEFI-based systems. This vulnerability, assigned CVE-2024-7344, was found in a UEFI application signed by Microsoft’s Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011 third-party UEFI certificate. Exploitation of this vulnerability leads to the execution of untrusted code during system boot, enabling potential attackers to easily deploy malicious UEFI bootkits (such as Bootkitty or BlackLotus) even on systems with UEFI Secure Boot enabled, regardless of the installed operating system.