It affected (before patching) all currently-maintained branches, and recently was highlighted by CISA as being exploited-in-the-wild.
This must be the first time real-world attackers have reversed a patch, and reproduced a vulnerability, before some dastardly researchers released a detection artefact generator tool of their own. /s
At watchTowr's core, we're all about identifying and validating ways into organisations - sometimes through vulnerabilities in network border appliances - without requiring such luxuries as credentials or asset lists.
Kryptina's adoption by Mallox affiliates complicates malware tracking as ransomware operators blend different codebases into new variants.
Every sysadmin is familiar with Veeam’s enterprise-oriented backup solution, ‘Veeam Backup & Replication’. Unfortunately, so is every ransomware operator, given it's somewhat 'privileged position' in the storage world of most enterprise's networks. There's no point deploying cryptolocker malware on a target unless you can also deny access to backups, and so, this class of attackers absolutely loves to break this particular software.
With so many eyes focussed on it, then, it is no huge surprise that it has a rich history of CVEs. Today, we're going to look at the latest episode - CVE-2024-40711.
Well, that was a complex vulnerability, requiring a lot of code-reading! We’ve successfully shown how multiple bugs can be chained together to gain RCE in a variety of versions of Veeam Backup & Replication.
This post is about sandbox evasion techniques and their usefulness in more targeted engagements.
There's a lot of sandbox evasion techniques, some are simple: query WMI, some are cool: parsing SMBIOS tables, most try to detect sandbox artifacts. I wanted to know if these techniques are still effective for detecting sandboxes, or if the sandboxes have since been updated to counter them.
In early July 2024, the Sentinel Labs researchers released an extensive article1 about “FIN7 reboot” tooling, notably introducing “AvNeutralizer”, an anti-EDR tool. This tool has been found in the wild as a packed payload.
In this article, we offer a thorough analysis of the associated private packer that we named “PackXOR”, as well as an unpacking tool. Additionally, while investigating the packer usage, we determined that PackXOR might not be exclusively leveraged by FIN7.
We have examined the Windows TCP/IP network stack flaw that could grant adversaries remote access with maximum privileges. Exploiting CVE-2024–38063 does not imply any action on the part of the user…
Imagine this: an OpenSSH backdoor is discovered, maintainers rush to push out a fixed release package, security researchers trade technical details on mailing lists to analyze the backdoor code. Speculation abounds on the attribution and motives of the attacker, and the tech media pounces on the story. A near miss of epic proportions, a blow to the fabric of trust underlying open source development, a stark reminder of the risks of supply-chain attacks. Equal measures brilliant and devious.
Welcome to the Finding Malware Series The "Finding Malware," blog series is authored to empower the Google Security Operations community to