| CyberScoop
cyberscoop.com/
By
Matt Kapko
January 22, 2026
Ianis Antropenko, a Russian national living in California, admitted to committing ransomware attacks against at least 50 victims. He faces up to 25 years in jail.
Russian national pleaded guilty to leading a ransomware conspiracy that targeted at least 50 victims during a four-year period ending in August 2022.
Ianis Aleksandrovich Antropenko began participating in ransomware attacks before moving to the United States, but conducted many of his crimes while living in Florida and California, where he’s been out on bond enjoying rare leniency since his arrest in 2024.
Antropenko pleaded guilty in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas earlier this month to conspiracy to commit money laundering and conspiracy to commit computer fraud and abuse. He faces up to 25 years in jail, fines up to $750,000 and is ordered to pay restitution to his victims and forfeit property.
Federal prosecutors reached a plea agreement with Antropenko after a years-long investigation, closing one of the more unusual cases against a Russian ransomware operator who committed many of his crimes while living in the U.S.
While most cybercriminals, especially those involved in ransomware, are held in jail pending trial because of a flight risk, Antropenko was granted bail the day of his arrest.
This rare flash of deferment in a case involving a prolific cybercriminal is even more shocking considering his multiple run-ins with police since then. Antropenko violated conditions for his pretrial release at least three times in a four-month period last year, including two arrests in Southern California involving dangerous behavior while under the influence of drugs and alcohol.
As part of his plea agreement, Antropenko recognized that pleading guilty could impact his immigration status since the crimes he committed are removable offenses.
Court records don’t indicate if Antropenko has been detained pending sentencing, and his sentencing hasn’t been scheduled. His attorney and federal prosecutors working on his case did not respond to requests for comment.
Antropenko admitted to leading the ransomware conspiracy with the aid of multiple co-conspirators, including some who lived outside the U.S.
His ex-wife, Valeriia Bednarchik, was previously implicated by the FBI and prosecutors as one of his alleged co-conspirators involved in the laundering of ransomware proceeds.
FBI investigators traced Antropenko’s activities via accounts he held at Proton Mail, PayPal and Bank of America, and accounts he and Bednarchik controlled at Binance and Apple. In Bednarchik’s iCloud account, agents found a seed phrase for a crypto wallet that had received over 40 Bitcoin from Antropenko’s accounts, as well as evidence she had agreed to safeguard a disguised copy of this phrase so the funds could be accessed if Antropenko became unavailable. Her account also contained joint tax returns with Antropenko and photos showing large amounts of U.S. cash.
Bednarchik, who also lives in Southern California, has been identified as Antropenko’s unnamed co-conspirator through court documents and public records. While authorities previously indicated they plan to bring charges against her, no cases are currently pending.
Antropenko, who previously pleaded not guilty to the charges in October 2025, used multiple ransomware variants to commit attacks, including Zeppelin and GlobeImposter. The ransomware operation he led caused losses of at least $1.5 million to victims, according to court records.
Yet, the spoils of his crimes appear to be much greater. The Justice Department seized more than $2.8 million in cryptocurrency, nearly $71,000 in cash and two luxury vehicles from Antropenko in February 2024. Authorities seized an additional $595,000 in cryptocurrency from a wallet Antropenko owned in July 2025.
| CyberScoop
cyberscoop.com
Written by Matt Kapko
November 7, 2025
Aleksei Olegovich Volkov served as an initial access broker and was involved in attacks on seven U.S. businesses from July 2021 through November 2022.
A25-year-old Russian national pleaded guilty to multiple charges stemming from their participation in ransomware attacks and faces a maximum penalty up to 53 years in prison.
Aleksei Olegovich Volkov, also known as “chubaka.kor,” served as the initial access broker for the Yanluowang ransomware group while living in Russia from July 2021 through November 2022, according to court records. Prosecutors accuse Volkov and unnamed co-conspirators of attacking seven U.S. businesses during that period, including two that paid a combined $1.5 million in ransoms.
The victims, which included an engineering firm and a bank, said executives received harassing phone calls and their networks were hit with distributed denial of service attacks after their data was stolen and encrypted by Yanluowang ransomware operators.
Cisco wasn’t named in the court filings for Volkov’s case, but the enterprise networking and security vendor said it was impacted by an attack attributed to Yanluowang ransomware in May 2022. Cisco linked the attack to an initial access broker who had ties to UNC2447, Lapsus$ and Yanluowang ransomware operators.
Volkov identified targets, exploited vulnerabilities in their systems, and shared access with co-conspirators for a flat fee or percentage of the ransom paid by the victim, according to prosecutors.
Some of Volkov’s alleged victims were unable to function normally without access to their data and had to temporarily shut down operations in the wake of the attacks. Prosecutors said the total amount demanded in ransoms from all seven victims was $24 million.
The FBI said it traced cryptocurrency transactions related to the payments to accounts reportedly owned by Volkov and a co-conspirator, “CC-1,” who was residing in Indianapolis at the time.
Blockchain analysis allowed the FBI to confirm Volkov’s identity and uncover multiple accounts they used to communicate with co-conspirators about ransomware attacks, payments and splitting illicit proceeds from their criminal activities, according to court records.
Volkov, who is also identified as Aleskey Olegovich Volkov in the unsealed indictment, was arrested Jan. 18, 2024, in Rome, where they were living at the time. Volkov was later extradited to the United States and remains in custody in Indiana.
Volkov previously filed an intention to plead guilty in April in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and agreed to have their case transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana.
Volkov pleaded guilty to six charges Oct. 29, including unlawful transfer of a means of identification, trafficking in access information, access device fraud, aggravated identity theft, conspiracy to commit computer fraud and conspiracy to commit money laundering. Court Watch was the first to report on Volkov’s guilty plea.
The plea agreement, which was filed Monday, did not include an agreed upon sentence, but Volkov is required to pay a combined restitution of nearly $9.2 million to the seven victims. Volkov’s attorney did not respond to a request for comment.
| CyberScoop
cyberscoop.com
Written by Matt Kapko
November 13, 2025
The newspaper said a “bad actor” contacted the company in late September, prompting an investigation that nearly a month later confirmed the extent of compromise.
he Washington Post said it, too, was impacted by the data theft and extortion campaign targeting Oracle E-Business Suite customers, compromising human resources data on nearly 10,000 current and former employees and contractors.
The company was first alerted to the attack and launched an investigation when a “bad actor” contacted the media company Sept. 29 claiming they gained access to the company’s Oracle applications, according to a data breach notification it filed in Maine Wednesday. The Washington Post later determined the attacker had access to its Oracle environment from July 10 to Aug. 22.
The newspaper is among dozens of Oracle customers targeted by the Clop ransomware group, which exploited a zero-day vulnerability affecting Oracle E-Business Suite to steal heaps of data. Other confirmed victims include Envoy Air and GlobalLogic.
The Washington Post said it confirmed the extent of data stolen during the attack on Oct. 27, noting that personal information on 9,720 people, including names, bank account numbers and routing numbers, and Social Security numbers were exposed. The company didn’t explain why it took almost a month to determine the amount of data stolen and has not responded to multiple requests for comment.
Oracle disclosed and issued a patch for the zero-day vulnerability — CVE-2025-61882 affecting Oracle E-Business Suite — in a security advisory Oct. 4, and previously said it was aware some customers had received extortion emails. Mandiant, responding to the immediate fallout from the attacks, said Clop exploited multiple vulnerabilities, including the zero-day to access and steal large amounts of data from Oracle E-Business Suite customer environments.
Oracle, its customers and third-party researchers were not aware of the attacks until executives of alleged victim organizations received extortion emails from members of Clop demanding payment in late September. Cynthia Kaiser, senior vice president of Halcyon’s ransomware research center, previously told CyberScoop ransom demands reached up to $50 million.
Clop’s data-leak site included almost 30 alleged victims as of last week. The notorious ransomware group has threatened to leak alleged victims’ data unless it receives payment.
The ransomware group has intruded multiple technology vendors’ systems before, allowing it to steal data and extort many downstream customers. Clop specializes in exploiting vulnerabilities in file-transfer services and achieved mass exploitation in 2023 when it infiltrated MOVEit environments, ultimately exposing data from more than 2,300 organizations.
cyberscoop.com
By
Matt Kapko
September 17, 2025
SonicWall said it confirmed an attack on its MySonicWall.com platform that exposed customers’ firewall configuration files.
The company confirmed to CyberScoop that an unidentified cybercriminal accessed SonicWall’s customer portal through a series of brute-force attacks.
SonicWall said it confirmed an attack on its MySonicWall.com platform that exposed customers’ firewall configuration files — the latest in a steady stream of security weaknesses impacting the besieged vendor and its customers.
The company’s security teams began investigating suspicious activity and validated the attack “in the past few days,” Bret Fitzgerald, senior director of global communications at SonicWall, told CyberScoop. “Our investigation determined that less than 5% of our firewall install base had backup firewall preference files stored in the cloud for these devices accessed by threat actors.”
While SonicWall customers have been repeatedly bombarded by actively exploited vulnerabilities in SonicWall devices, this attack marks a new pressure point — an attack on a customer-facing system the company controls.
This distinction is significant because it indicates systemic security shortcomings exist throughout SonicWall’s product lines, internal infrastructure and practices.
“Incidents like this underscore the importance of security vendors — not just SonicWall — to hold themselves to the same or higher standards that they expect of their customers,” Mauricio Sanchez, senior director of enterprise security and networking research at Dell’Oro Group, told CyberScoop.
“When the compromise occurs in a vendor-operated system rather than a customer-deployed product, the consequences can be particularly damaging because trust in the vendor’s broader ecosystem is at stake,” he added.
SonicWall acknowledged the potential downstream risk for customers is severe. “While the files contained encrypted passwords, they also included information that could make it easier for attackers to potentially exploit firewalls,” Fitzgerald said.
“This was not a ransomware or similar event for SonicWall, rather this was a series of account-by-account brute force attacks aimed at gaining access to the preference files stored in backup for potential further use by threat actors,” he added.
SonicWall did not identify or name those responsible for the attack, adding that it hasn’t seen evidence of any online leaks of the stolen files. The company said it disabled access to the backup feature, took steps across infrastructure and processes to bolster the security of its systems and initiated an investigation with assistance from an incident response and consulting firm.
Sanchez described the breach as a serious issue. “These files often contain detailed network architecture, rules, and policies that could provide attackers with a roadmap to exploit weaknesses more efficiently,” he said. “While resetting credentials is a necessary first step, it does not address the potential long-term risks tied to the information already in adversaries’ hands.”
SonicWall said it has notified law enforcement, impacted customers and partners. Customers can check if impacted serial numbers are listed in their MySonicWall account, and those determined to be at risk are advised to reset credentials, contain, remediate and monitor logs for unusual activity.
Many vendors allow customers to store configuration data in cloud-managed portals, a practice that introduces inherent risks, Sanchez said.
“Vendors must continuously weigh the convenience provided against the potential consequences of compromise, and customers should hold them accountable to strong transparency and remediation practices when incidents occur,” he added.
Organizations using SonicWall firewalls have confronted persistent attack sprees for years, as evidenced by the vendor’s 14 appearances on CISA’s known exploited vulnerabilities catalog since late 2021. Nine of those defects are known to be used in ransomware campaigns, according to CISA, including a recent wave of about 40 Akira ransomware attacks.
Fitzgerald said SonicWall is committed to full transparency and the company will share updates as its investigation continues.
| CyberScoop By
Tim Starks
September 10, 202
Major cyber intrusions by the Chinese hacking groups known as Salt Typhoon and Volt Typhoon have forced the FBI to change its methods of hunting sophisticated threats, a top FBI cyber official said Wednesday.
U.S. officials, allied governments and threat researchers have identified Salt Typhoon as the group behind the massive telecommunications hack revealed last fall but that could have been ongoing for years. Investigators have pointed at Volt Typhoon as a group that has infiltrated critical infrastructure to cause disruptions in the United States if China invades Taiwan and Americans intervene.
Those hacks were stealthier than in the past, and more patient, said Jason Bilnoski, deputy assistant director of the FBI’s cyber division. The Typhoons have focused on persistent access and gotten better at hiding their infiltration by using “living off the land” techniques that involve using legitimate tools within systems to camouflage their efforts, he said. That in turn has complicated FBI efforts to share indicators of compromise (IOCs).
“We’re having to now hunt as if they’re already on the network, and we’re hunting in ways we hadn’t before,” he said at the Billington Cybersecurity Summit. “They’re not dropping tools and malware that we used to see, and perhaps there’s not a lot of IOCs that we’d be able to share in certain situations.”
The hackers used to be “noisy,” with an emphasis on hitting a target quickly, stealing data and then escaping, Bilnoski said. But now for nation-backed attackers, “we’re watching exponential leaps” in tactics, techniques and procedures, he said.
Jermaine Roebuck, associate director for threat hunting at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, said his agency is also seeing those kinds of changes in the level of stealth from sophisticated hackers, in addition to “a significant change” in their intentions and targeting.
“We saw a lot of espionage over the last several years, but here lately, there’s been a decided shift into computer network attack, prepositioning or disruption in terms of capabilities,” he said at the same conference.
The targeting has changed as organizations, including government agencies, have shifted to the cloud. “Well, guess what?” he asked. “The actors are going toward the cloud” in response.
They’ve also focused on “edge devices,” like devices that supply virtual private network connections or other services provided by managed service providers, Roebuck said. Organizations have less insight into the attacks those devices and providers are facing than more direct intrusions, he said.
cyberscoop.com
article By
Tim Starks
August 27, 2025
Google says it is starting a cyber “disruption unit,” a development that arrives in a potentially shifting U.S. landscape toward more offensive-oriented approaches in cyberspace.
But the contours of that larger shift are still unclear, and whether or to what extent it’s even possible. While there’s some momentum in policymaking and industry circles to put a greater emphasis on more aggressive strategies and tactics to respond to cyberattacks, there are also major barriers.
Sandra Joyce, vice president of Google Threat Intelligence Group, said at a conference Tuesday that more details of the disruption unit would be forthcoming in future months, but the company was looking for “legal and ethical disruption” options as part of the unit’s work.
“What we’re doing in the Google Threat Intelligence Group is intelligence-led proactive identification of opportunities where we can actually take down some type of campaign or operation,” she said at the Center for Cybersecurity Policy and Law event, where she called for partners in the project. “We have to get from a reactive position to a proactive one … if we’re going to make a difference right now.”
The boundaries in the cyber domain between actions considered “cyber offense” and those meant to deter cyberattacks are often unclear. The tradeoff between “active defense” vs. “hacking back” is a common dividing line. On the less aggressive end, “active defense” can include tactics like setting up honeypots designed to lure and trick attackers. At the more extreme end, “hacking back” would typically involve actions that attempt to deliberately destroy an attacker’s systems or networks. Disruption operations might fall between the two, like Microsoft taking down botnet infrastructure in court or the Justice Department seizing stolen cryptocurrency from hackers.
Trump administration officials and some in Congress have been advocating for the U.S. government to go on offense in cyberspace, saying that foreign hackers and criminals aren’t suffering sufficient consequences. Much-criticized legislation to authorize private sector “hacking back” has long stalled in Congress, but some have recently pushed a version of the idea where the president would give “letters of marque” like those for early-U.S. sea privateers to companies authorizing them to legally conduct offensive cyber operations currently forbidden under U.S. law.
The private sector has some catching up to do if there’s to be a worthy field of firms able to focus on offense, experts say.
John Keefe, a former National Security Council official from 2022 to 2024 and National Security Agency official before that, said there had been government talks about a “narrow” letters of marque approach “with the private sector companies that we thought had the capabilities.” The concept was centered on ransomware, Russia and rules of the road for those companies to operate. “It wasn’t going to be the Wild West,” said Keefe, now founder of Ex Astris Scientia, speaking like others in this story at Tuesday’s conference.
The companies with an emphasis on offense largely have only one customer — and that’s governments, said Joe McCaffrey, chief information security officer at defense tech company Anduril Industries. “It’s a really tough business to be in,” he said. “If you develop an exploit, you get to sell to one person legally, and then it gets burned, and you’re back again.”
By their nature, offensive cyber operations in the federal government are already very time- and manpower-intensive, said Brandon Wales, a former top official at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and now vice president of cybersecurity at SentinelOne. Private sector companies could make their mark by innovating ways to speed up and expand the number of those operations, he said.
Overall, among the options of companies that could do more offensive work, the “industry doesn’t exist yet, but I think it’s coming,” said Andrew McClure, managing director at Forgepoint Capital.
Certainly Congress would have to clarify what companies are able to do legally as well, Wales said.
But that’s just the industry side. There’s plenty more to weigh when stepping up offense.
“However we start, we need to make sure that we are having the ability to measure impact,” said Megan Stifel, chief strategy officer for the Institute for Security and Technology. “Is this working? How do we know?”
If there was a consensus at the conference it’s that the United States — be it the government or private sector — needs to do more to deter adversaries in cyberspace by going after them more in cyberspace.
One knock on that idea has been that the United States can least afford to get into a cyber shooting match, since it’s more reliant on tech than other nations and an escalation would hurt the U.S. the most by presenting more vulnerable targets for enemies. But Dmitri Alperovitch, chairman of the Silverado Policy Accelerator, said that idea was wrong for a couple reasons, among them that other nations have become just as reliant on tech, too.
And “the very idea that in this current bleak state of affairs, engaging in cyber offense is escalatory, I propose to you, is laughable,” he said. “After all, what are our adversaries going to escalate to in response? Ransom more of our hospitals, penetrate more of our water and electric utilities, steal even more of our IP and financial assets?”
Alperovitch continued: “Not only is engaging in thoughtful and careful cyber offense not escalatory, but not doing so is.”
cyberscoop.com August 20, 2025 - A Russian state-sponsored group known as Static Tundra has persistently exploited the Cisco CVE-2018-0171 vulnerability to compromise network devices worldwide, targeting key industries and evading detection for years, according to new findings by Cisco Talos.
The group, designated “Static Tundra” by Cisco Talos, is linked to the Russian Federal Security Service’s Center 16 unit and operates as a likely sub-cluster of the broader “Energetic Bear” threat group. The operation represents one of the most persistent network device compromise campaigns documented to date, with the group maintaining undetected access to victim systems for multiple years.
According to the researchers, the group has been leveraging CVE-2018-0171, a vulnerability in Cisco IOS software’s Smart Install feature that was patched when initially disclosed in 2018. Despite the availability of patches, the group continues to find success targeting organizations that have left devices unpatched or are running end-of-life equipment that cannot be updated.
The vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected devices or trigger denial-of-service conditions.
Researchers believe the group has developed automated tooling to exploit the vulnerability at scale, likely identifying targets through publicly available network scanning data from services such as Shodan or Censys.
Once initial access is gained, the group employs sophisticated techniques to extract device configuration data, which often contains credentials and network information valuable for further compromise. The attackers use a combination of Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) servers and Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) tools to maintain access and collect intelligence.
The espionage campaign has affected organizations in telecommunications, higher education, and manufacturing sectors across North America, Asia, Africa, and Europe. Victim selection appears to align with Russia’s strategic interests, with researchers noting a significant escalation in operations against Ukrainian entities following the onset of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
“One of the clearer targeting shifts we observed was that Static Tundra’s operations against entities in Ukraine escalated at the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, and have remained high since then,” the Cisco Talos report states. The group expanded its targeting within Ukraine from selective, limited compromises to operations across multiple industry verticals.