The Chinese Ministry of State Security intelligence service disclosed in October that the U.S. National Security Agency has been engaged in a three-year cyber campaign to break into the official National Time Service Center.
The center is located in the north-central city of Xian. It provides precision time services that state media say are vital for military systems, communications, finance, electricity, transportation and mapping.
The NSA had no comment on the report, but defense analysts say the Chinese report is a significant clue to one of the most secret programs in support of an advanced form of strategic missile defense called “left of launch.”
Left of launch refers to a timeline for using various military tools, such as cyberattacks that could cause missiles to blow up in silos when launch buttons are pushed, special operations commandos and on-the-ground sabotage after a missile is detected being readied for firing.
The project to conduct prelaunch attacks and sabotage of missile systems has been underway for at least a decade, and its elements are among the U.S. military’s most closely guarded secrets.
Asked recently how left of launch will be used in President Trump’s forthcoming Golden Dome defense system to prevent a missile from being fired, Space Force Gen. Michael A. Guetlein, vice chief of space operations, said cryptically: “Can’t talk about it.”
PNT satellite system
Gaining access to China’s central time system would provide a major advantage to the U.S. military and military intelligence services during a conflict by allowing hackers to disrupt missile strikes before launch or shortly after launch, known as the boost phase.
The time center is a key element of China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system, a copy of the U.S. GPS, which uses more than 35 satellites to provide the People’s Liberation Army with vital PNT — positioning, navigation and timing — for its missile systems.
The satellite system is said to provide “centimeter-level” precision and is linked to the National Time Service Center.
Theoretically, NSA cyber sleuths, by breaching the time center, could have planted malicious software inside the PNT data chain that could then be used for intelligence gathering on missile targets and providing false navigation parameters for missile strikes.
U.S. advanced artificial intelligence technology also could fashion prelaunch disruptions that could retarget Chinese missiles against Beijing.
A Chinese state media report on the NSA cyberattacks stated that control over timing is equivalent to “controlling the heartbeat of modern society.”
“Once the timing system is interfered with or hijacked, the consequences are unimaginable,” the online Chinese communications outlet C114 reported. It noted potential disruptions of financial markets, power grids, rail lines and military systems.
For missile systems, PNT is an essential element for real-time location, direction and precise time data used for accurate targeting, trajectory control and command and control.
“There’s no doubt that the best time to defeat a missile is before it’s launched,” said Todd Harrison, a defense expert with the American Enterprise Institute. “The most obvious way is to track and destroy the launchers and the command and control infrastructure and sensors that enable them.”
Conducting the attacks is difficult because of the distances involved and the risks of escalation.
Various non-kinetic tools can be used to defeat a missile “kill chain” before launch, including jamming sensors and communications, and cyberattacks on command and control systems, Mr. Harrison said.
Electronic disruptions before launch can produce uncertain effectiveness during combat, even if they initially produce impacts, because thinking adversaries will adapt and overcome the disruptions.
“The question for Golden Dome is how much relative effort the architecture puts toward left of launch versus other phases of flight,” Mr. Harrison said. “Left of launch will surely be part of the approach, but we still don’t know how much emphasis it will garner.”
Sensors and capabilities
Mr. Trump’s executive order on missile defense, signed in January, specifically calls for developing and deploying left-of-launch capabilities for Golden Dome.
The order states that in addition to deploying defenses targeting missiles in midflight and terminal phases, the new system must “defeat missile attacks prior to launch and in the boost phase.”
Gen. Stephen Whiting, commander of U.S. Space Command, said in September that left-of-launch defenses will provide a next-generation missile defense capability.
Prelaunch defenses are needed because enemy missiles are becoming more precise and more lethal, he said at a defense conference.
“We are seeing both the capacity and the capability of the threat missiles we’re now facing rapidly increase,” Gen. Whiting said at the annual Air, Space & Cyber Conference. “Just look over the last 18 months in the Israel-Iran conflict … multiple salvos of missiles, not single-digit missiles, not double-digit missiles. We’re talking triple-digit missile salvos paired with one-way attack drones.”
Gen. Whiting said current missile defenses are capable of providing warning and tracking of traditional ballistic missiles, but newer high-speed hypersonic maneuvering missiles and space-based hypersonic missiles are “incredibly destabilizing.”
“Our missile defenses have done broadly a good job during the most recent conflicts, but most of those are focused on terminal engagement,” the general said.
“We want to be able to push that engagement to the left, and eventually left of launch,” he said.
To conduct such prelaunch strikes, greater sensor integration is needed, and more sophisticated cyberattacks will be used to “drive capabilities that allow us to affect targets before they even begin to launch,” Gen. Whiting said.
Robert Peters, senior research fellow for strategic deterrence and The Heritage Foundation, said one of the more promising elements of the Golden Dome will be deploying better overhead sensors and coupling them with theater defense sensors. The advanced sensors will enhance homeland missile defenses by providing significantly greater awareness of when enemy missiles are being readied for launch, and then provide more accurate data once a missile is fired.
“This better integration of data and sensors greatly increases a state’s ability to intercept missiles before they hit their targets,” Mr. Peters said.
Launch preparations for solid-fuel missiles in silos, such as China’s new fields of more than 350 intercontinental ballistic missiles in western China, will be more difficult to detect before launch.
Mobile ICBMs moved out of garrison in preparation for launch have signatures that can be tracked more easily as part of left-of-launch defenses, Mr. Peters said.
“Golden Dome, if done properly, will invest heavily in these types of sensor architectures, not simply on more and more modern interceptors, as critical as those are,” Mr. Peters said.
Israel’s military conducted a series of left-of-launch strikes on Iranian missiles before the joint U.S.-Israeli bombing raid on Iran’s key nuclear facilities.
The Israel Defense Forces released videos of airstrikes on several Iranian mobile missiles that were blown up before they could be fired in retaliatory attacks.
Israeli forces also conducted sabotage operations inside Iran. They neutralized some key missile technicians in the days before the June raid on three nuclear facilities, according to an Israeli think tank report.
In addition to better sensors and increased cyberattack capabilities, special operations forces also will be developed for prelaunch strikes on targets.
Left-of-launch options
Lt. Gen. Sean Farrell, deputy commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, said special operations commandos are working on left-of-launch missile defense capabilities for missiles and drones.
“We have been working left of launch on behalf of the [Defense] Department to try to understand how we can get after the threats before they become a threat,” Gen. Farrell said at the conference with Gen. Whiting. “I think a lot of that will translate as well if we’re able to synchronize and plan together at the strategic level on where we can bring left-of-launch attention to a layered approach to homeland defense.”
The ultimate goal of the layered and integrated missile defense is to deploy an array of forces across all military domains that can detect, disrupt and potentially stop missile threats before they emerge.
Left-of-launch capabilities have been a topic within the Pentagon since at least 2014, when a memorandum was disclosed from Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno to the secretary of defense warning that missile defense spending was “unsustainable” because of sharp defense cuts.
The two military leaders called for building more cost-effective left-of-launch capabilities.
Defense officials at the time said the research for left of launch included non-kinetic weapons, such as cyberattacks and electronic warfare, including electromagnetic pulse attacks against missile command and control systems.
These weapons would be used after missile launch preparations are detected. They would disrupt or disable launch controls or send malicious commands to cause the missiles to explode on their launchers.
In 2016, Adm. William Gortney, then commander of U.S. Northern Command, stated in prepared congressional testimony that most missile defenses are designed to intercept missiles after launch, using ground-based interceptors, mobile regional defenses and ship-based anti-missile systems.
“We need to augment our defensive posture with one that is designed to defeat ballistic missile threats in the boost phase as well as before they are launched, known as ‘left of launch,’” Adm. Gortney said.
Other potential boost-phase defenses could include high-powered lasers deployed on drones or aircraft that can strike missiles just after launch.
All current missile defense systems use kinetic kill interceptors that require precision targeting data to knock out high-speed warheads. They include Patriot, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, and large Ground-Based Interceptors in Alaska and California, an Aegis missile defense based mostly on ships and in several ground locations.
The Golden Dome will deploy space-based interceptors for the first time, providing greater coverage against missile threats.
Kenneth Todorov, former deputy director of the Missile Defense Agency and now vice president at Northrop Grumman Missile Defense Solutions, said the company is working on left-of-launch capabilities and counter-hypersonic missile efforts.
“With decades of experience supporting mission-critical defense programs across the entire kill chain, the company is bringing to bear a portfolio of advanced, innovative capabilities from left of launch, through detection and tracking, all the way to assessment of kill, delivering mission agility in addressing the evolving hypersonic threat,” Mr. Todorov said on the Northrop website.
Patrycja Bazylczyk, associate director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said left-of-launch defenses include a broad category of kinetic and non-kinetic efforts to counter enemy launches. They can include strikes on missile launchers, jamming enemy communications or infiltrating a missile factory.
“Left-of-launch efforts are not alternatives to active missile defenses; they work in tandem, allowing U.S. forces to more effectively counter enemy action rather than merely respond to it,” Ms. Bazylczyk said.
san.com Aug 23, 2025 at 12:34 AM GMT+2
A hacker breached an airline and stole information on hundreds of thousands of people, including U.S. government employees.
Summary
Exposed IDs
Straight Arrow News examined 2,626 photos of identifying documents such as passports, IDs and birth certificates that were stolen by a hacker.
U.S. government data
The data includes the names, emails and phone numbers of employees from the State Deptartment, ICE, TSA, CBP and more.
Airline denial
Uzbekistan Airways denied that any intrusion took place and even suggested that leaked data may have been generated with artificial intelligence.
Full story
A hacker claims to have stolen information on hundreds of thousands of people — including U.S. government employees — after breaching an international airline. Straight Arrow News obtained a sample of the data, allegedly taken from Uzbekistan Airways, and confirmed the presence of sensitive documents such as scans of thousands of passports.
The data was advertised on Thursday by the hacker, who is known online as ByteToBreach and purports to be a native of the Swiss Alps, on a dark web forum known for hosting leaks, malware and hacking tools. The purportedly 300-gigabyte data cache contains, among other things, the email addresses of 500,000 passengers and 400 airline employees.
The post included a sample of the data, such as alleged credentials for multiple servers and software programs run by the airline. It also showed partial credit card data, as well as scans of 75 passports from the U.S., Russia, Israel, the U.K., South Korea and other nations. The hacker claims to have obtained identifying documents from more than 40 different countries.
The hacker provided Straight Arrow News with a larger data sample than the one posted online, containing 2,626 photos of identifying documents such as passports, IDs, marriage licenses and birth certificates. Numerous passports belonged to babies and young children.
Passports and other identifying data are valuable on underground markets given their potential use for a range of criminal activities, such as fraud and identity theft. Hackers could also leverage the prevalence of data on government employees for phishing attacks.
U.S. government employees’ data compromised
Another document from the sample the hacker provided to SAN contained 285 email addresses belonging to airline employees. A list of email addresses for passengers held 503,410 entries.
A spreadsheet with personal information of 379,603 members of Uzbekistan Airways’ loyalty program exposes names, genders, birthdates, nationalities, email addresses, phone numbers, member IDs and more.
The email addresses indicate that those members include employees of several U.S. government agencies, including the State Department, the Department of Energy, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection and the Transportation Security Administration.
Employees of foreign government agencies from countries like Russia, Uzbekistan and the United Arab Emirates were also in the data.
SAN reached out to several phone numbers of government employees. An apparent TSA employee answered the phone by introducing themselves with the first name listed in the hacked data, as well as their government position. After SAN explained that their data had been exposed, the employee declined to comment and referred a reporter to the Department of Homeland Security’s public affairs office.
The public affairs office did not respond to an email from SAN. An email to the State Department’s office of press operations went unanswered as well.
Four files containing raw reservation and ticketing data mention airlines, airports, flight numbers and other information. The hacker also claimed that the raw data contained partial credit card information, although SAN was unable to independently verify the presence of financial data.
...
politico.com - The identities of confidential court informants are feared compromised in a series of breaches across multiple U.S. states.
The electronic case filing system used by the federal judiciary has been breached in a sweeping cyber intrusion that is believed to have exposed sensitive court data across multiple U.S. states, according to two people with knowledge of the incident.
The hack, which has not been previously reported, is feared to have compromised the identities of confidential informants involved in criminal cases at multiple federal district courts, said the two people, both of whom were granted anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly about the hack.
The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts — which manages the federal court filing system — first determined how serious the issue was around July 4, said the first person. But the office, along with the Justice Department and individual district courts around the country, is still trying to determine the full extent of the incident.
It is not immediately clear who is behind the hack, though nation-state-affiliated actors are widely suspected, the people said. Criminal organizations may also have been involved, they added.
The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts declined to comment. Asked whether it is investigating the incident, the FBI referred POLITICO to the Justice Department. The Justice Department did not immediately reply to a request for comment.
It is not immediately clear how the hackers got in, but the incident is known to affect the judiciary’s federal core case management system, which includes two overlapping components: Case Management/Electronic Case Files, or CM/ECF, which legal professionals use to upload and manage case documents; and PACER, a system that gives the public limited access to the same data.
In addition to records on witnesses and defendants cooperating with law enforcement, the filing system includes other sensitive information potentially of interest to foreign hackers or criminals, such as sealed indictments detailing non-public information about alleged crimes, and arrests and search warrants that criminal suspects could use to evade capture.
Chief judges of the federal courts in the 8th Circuit — which includes Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota — were briefed on the hack at a judicial conference last week in Kansas City, said the two people. It is unclear who delivered the brief, though the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judge Robert J. Conrad, Jr., was in attendance, per the first person. Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh was also in attendance but didn’t address the breach in his remarks.
Staff for Conrad, a district judge in the Western District of North Carolina, declined to comment.
The hack is the latest sign that the federal court filing system is struggling to keep pace with a rising wave of cybersecurity threats.
The pro-Israeli hacktivist group Predatory Sparrow claimed on Tuesday to have hacked and taken down Iran’s Bank Sepah.
The group, which is also known by its Persian name Gonjeshke Darande, claimed responsibility for the hack on X.
“We, ‘Gonjeshke Darande,’ conducted cyberattacks which destroyed the data of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ ‘Bank Sepah,’” the group wrote.
The group claimed Bank Sepah is an institution that “circumvented international sanctions and used the people of Iran’s money to finance the regime’s terrorist proxies, its ballistic missile program and its military nuclear program.”
According to the independent news site Iran International, there are reports of “widespread banking disruptions” across the country. Iran International said several Bank Sepah branches were closed on Tuesday, and customers told the publication that they were unable to access their accounts.
Ariel Oseran, a correspondent for i24NEWS, posted pictures of ATMs in Iran displaying an error message.
TechCrunch could not independently verify the group’s alleged cyberattack. We reached out to two Bank Sepah Iranian email addresses, but the messages returned an error. Bank Sepah’s affiliates in the U.K. and Italy did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
Predatory Sparrow did not respond to a request for comment sent to their X account, and via Telegram.
The alleged cyberattack on Bank Sepah comes as Israel and Iran are bombing each other’s countries, a conflict that started after Israel began targeting nuclear energy facilities, military bases, and senior Iranian military officials on Friday.
It’s unclear who is behind Predatory Sparrow. The group clearly fashions itself as a pro-Israel or at least anti-Iran hacktivist group and has targeted companies and organizations in Iran for years. Cybersecurity researchers believe the group has had success in the past and made credible claims.
Apple on Monday updated visionOS, the operating system powering its Vision Pro virtual reality headset, to version 1.2, which addresses several vulnerabilities, including what may be the first security flaw that is specific to this product.
visionOS 1.2 patches nearly two dozen vulnerabilities. However, a vast majority of them are in components that visionOS shares with other Apple products, such as iOS, macOS and tvOS.
Researchers have discovered several vulnerabilities in popular WordPress plugins that allow attackers to create rogue admin accounts.
#attacks #breach #computer #cyber #data #hack #hacker #hacking #how #information #malware #network #news #ransomware #security #software #the #to #today #updates #vulnerability
Researchers uncover a fresh wave of the Raspberry Robin campaign spreading malware through malicious Windows Script Files (WSFs) since March 2024.
#attacks #breach #computer #cyber #data #hack #hacker #hacking #how #information #malware #network #news #ransomware #security #software #the #to #today #updates #vulnerability
I began my search for opportunities and stumbled upon a list of eligible websites for bug hunting at https://gist.github.com/R0X4R/81e6c50c091a20b060afe5c259b58cfa. This list became my starting…
PlugwalkJoe, aka Joseph James O’Connor, a UK citizen connected to the 2020 Twitter hack affecting many high-profile accounts, including Elon Musk, Joe Biden, Barack Obama, and Apple, has pled guilty to cyberstalking and other crimes. On Tuesday, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that O’Connor has been extradited to the US.
It was late 2019, and Adair, the president of the security firm Volexity, was investigating a digital security breach at an American think tank. The intrusion was nothing special. Adair figured he and his team would rout the attackers quickly and be done with the case—until they noticed something strange. A second group of hackers was active in the think tank’s network. They were going after email, making copies and sending them to an outside server. These intruders were much more skilled, and they were returning to the network several times a week to siphon correspondence from specific executives, policy wonks, and IT staff.