Korea JoongAng daily
Friday
October 17, 2025
The Korean government officially acknowledged Friday that hackers had accessed the Onnara system — a government work management platform — and administrative digital signature certificates called the government public key infrastructure (GPKI), which are essential for civil servant authentication.
Authorities said they are investigating how the breach occurred and assessing the extent of the damage, while also implementing new security measures.
During a press briefing at the government complex in Sejong, the Ministry of the Interior and Safety confirmed that “in mid-July, the National Intelligence Service (NIS) discovered signs that an external party accessed the Onnara system via the Government Virtual Private Network (G-VPN).”
Two months to acknowledge hacking
The statement came two months after a report by Phrack Magazine, a U.S.-based cybersecurity publication, claimed that the Ministry of the Interior and Safety, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Unification, Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, telecom companies KT and LG U+ and private tech firms including Daum, Kakao and Naver, had all been targeted by hackers.
Until now, the Korean government had remained silent, but on Friday, it acknowledged the report’s claims were accurate.
The NIS is currently working with relevant agencies to determine how the breach occurred and to evaluate the scope of any data leaks. While the Ministry of the Interior and Safety said there has been no confirmed leak of government documents so far, it did not rule out the possibility of such leaks being uncovered during the investigation.
In response to the breach, the government has taken steps to strengthen its cybersecurity protocols.
“Since Aug. 4, remote access to the G-VPN has required not only digital signature authentication but also phone-based verification,” said Lee Yong-seok, head of the digital government innovation office at the Interior Ministry. “Additionally, we completed measures to prevent the reuse of login credentials for the Onnara system, which were applied to all central and local government agencies on July 28.”
Regarding GPKI, the government reviewed the validity of all certificates with information provided by the NIS. Most of the compromised certificates had already expired, and those that were still valid were revoked as of Aug. 13, according to the ministry.
NIS still investigating breach origin
The government also shared the preliminary results of its investigation into the cause of the breach, attributing it to user negligence that led to certificate information being leaked externally.
“All central and local government agencies have been instructed to stop sharing certificates and to strengthen management protocols,” the Interior Ministry said.
Although the North Korean hacking group Kimsuky was initially suspected to be behind the attack, the NIS said there was insufficient evidence to definitively identify the perpetrator. Kimsuky is known for targeting diplomatic, security and defense sectors to gather intelligence for the North Korean regime.
To counter security threats related to certificate theft or duplication, the government announced plans to replace GPKI-based authentication with biometric multi-factor methods, such as mobile government IDs for public officials.
The government also intends to expand the use of secure authentication technologies — including biometric-based digital IDs — across public services for the general population.
“If the NIS identifies any additional issues, we will immediately address and respond to them,” Lee said. “We will do everything we can to prevent a similar incident from happening again.”
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) today notified Congress of a major information security incident, as required by the Federal Information Security Modernization Act.
This finding is the result of internal and independent third-party reviews of OCC emails and email attachments that were subject to unauthorized access. On February 11, 2025, the OCC learned of unusual interactions between a system administrative account in its office automation environment and OCC user mailboxes. On February 12, the OCC confirmed the activity was unauthorized and immediately activated its incident response protocols which include initiating an independent third-party incident assessment and reporting the incident to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. On February 12, the OCC disabled the compromised administrative accounts and confirmed that the unauthorized access had been terminated. The OCC provided public notice of the incident on February 26.
Apple recently addressed a macOS vulnerability that allows attackers to bypass System Integrity Protection (SIP) and install malicious kernel drivers by loading third-party kernel extensions.
#Apple #Computer #InfoSec #Integrity #Microsoft #Protection #SIP #Security #System #Vulnerability #macOS
CrowdStrike says it has revamped several testing, validation, and update rollout processes to prevent a repeat of the embarrassing July outage that caused widespread disruption on Windows systems around the world.
Reconstructing the Attack from a 4th party collector’s point of view
Hamid Kashfi
[Update: December 18th, 2023]: On 18th December, Predator Sparrows launched a second
attack against the fuel distribution system in Iran, similar to their previous operation in 2021.
Since 2021, Iranian officials or third-party security vendors have not published any analysis or
technical details about the original attack, which is not unusual. Their screenshots from the
latest attacks provide some clues that only confirm our previous work, indicating connections to
the “Yaas Arghavani” company, a VSAT and POS service provider for the fuel distribution
system. The following is an old draft from December 2021, which I wrote for peer eyes rather
than public view. The original draft focused on the first attack against the fuel distribution
system. Still, some remarks remain valid and relevant to the recent attack on 18 Dec 2023, as
little has changed regarding how the system works. The same infrastructure, same suppliers,
and same 3rd party vendors, so we are likely just talking about a different attack vector and
entry point from the previous case. I will probably draft a new note about the recent attack from
scratch soon and when more details are gathered rather than updating the old speculative work.
I’m a Swiss voter living abroad, and like all Swiss expats from Basel-Stadt, St.Gallen or Thurgau, I’ve been invited to vote over the internet in this year’s national election. Switzerland’s e-voting system is supposed to have safeguards to protect the election against malicious actors, however as a computer scientist, I have found a flaw in the practical implementation of one of those safeguards.